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1 Introduction 
 
 
In this thesis, customer churn is analyzed among movers in the Finnish insurance market. 
Econometric modeling is conducted based on a sample of an insurer’s customer data to find 
variables (i.e. characteristics and preferences) that predict churn among customers around the 
time of their move. The theory upon which this modeling is based was pioneered by Nobel-
laureate Daniel McFadden and his contemporaries in the field of discrete choice. 
 
Per Posti (2017a), close to one in five Finns moved homes in 2016. Moving homes, i.e. 
changing from one address to another triggers the moving individual to proactively take action 
on two activities: 
1. File an official change of address with the Finnish Postal service (Posti). 
2. Renew all address-based subscription services, such as electricity, internet and home 
insurance. This thesis focuses solely on insurers and their customers. 
Activity 1 enables Posti to be a reliable authority on address changes in Finland. Posti keeps 
records, but also does business by providing data and marketing opportunities to providers of 
the subscription services described above. 
Activity 2 leads to moving being a crucial moment in any continuous customership, as the 
product related to the old address will be terminated, giving the moving customer the opening 
to explore options elsewhere. 
 
When a customer cancels their existing subscription in favor of a competitor, it is said that 
customer has churned. Minimizing churn is as important to an insurer’s business as sales, with 
the distinction that retaining customers is more cost effective than acquiring new ones. 
Therefore understanding who the likely churners are - based on available characteristics and 
revealed preferences - allows the insurer to accurately and appropriately target high churn-risk 
individuals out of a large mass of movers, to minimize churn and subsequently improve result. 
 
The work begins with a review of basic concepts of risk and insurance in Chapter 2. Hillson & 
Murray Webster (2007) provide a compact breakdown of risk and management thereof, while 
Vaughan’s Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance (1996) complements by defining key concepts 
in the insurance business along with a look back into history at what preceded the modern 
industry. As this thesis focuses on moving and insuring specifically in Finland, it is important 
 7 
to present the modern insurance market in Finland in greater detail. The annual report on the 
insurance industry, published by Finance Finland (2017) serves as foundation for the 
introduction of key indicators of insurance business as well as the competitive situation in the 
market as of 2016. 
 
Among the key performance indicators reviewed in Chapter 2 is retention and its counterpart – 
churn. Chapter 3 details the event of moving homes as a distinct driver of churn, not only in 
insurance but all fields of business offering address-related services on subscriptions 
(electricity, internet, etc). Publications by Posti (2016, 2017a, 2017b) serve as the factual basis 
for this chapter. Combining the model of insurance business with what we know about moving 
customers allows us to formulate the research problem with guidance from Jaccard & Jacoby 
(2010): what kind of customer characteristics and preferences indicate an increased risk of 
churning? Understanding and identifying high-churn-risk individuals allows the insurer to be 
more efficient in retention-improving customer save -activities. 
 
Before creating a model and experimenting, the scientific basis must be established. In Chapter 
4 previous work in the field of choice theory and modeling is reviewed. Churning is a choice 
between two alternatives; an address change forces the customer to explicitly choose whether 
to remain with their current insurer or churn and join a competitor. Papers detailing the 
application of choice theory into churn problems in the fields of telecommunications and 
internet services are presented (Madden et al. 1999, Kim 2004, etc.), but the theoretical 
backbone of churn models – as the one created in this thesis – is the comprehensive work of 
Nobel laureate Daniel McFadden. Chapter 4 presents the early, pre-McFadden era choice theory 
(Pareto 1906, Marschak & Block 1960, Hartley 1996) as well as McFadden’s own research 
(1974, 2000) that together with the improved availability of individual data, shaped modern 
choice modeling. In essence, the modern binary choice model – such as a churn model - uses 
available individual characteristics and preferences towards service attributes to assign a 
probability of churn for each individual. The regression yields weights and significances for 
each variable (characteristics and preferences) that can help segment the mass of customers 
based on their churn probabilities.  
 
The churn modeling is conducted in Chapter 5. I offer a sample of 50 000 individuals, provided 
by a Finnish insurer for discussion. The data is manipulated by individual analysis of variables, 
based on which 21 appropriate descriptors remain. Additionally the sample is subsetted to only 
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include customers who had an active home insurance before their address change. The 
remaining sample consists of 24 230 observations. 
 
In order to capture the full volume of churners it is necessary to run three experiments.  
1. All customers who canceled their home insurance are treated as churners. The model is 
created by regressing home churners on specified variables. 
2. The second model is created by treating customers who canceled all insurance products 
as churners. Full churn is regressed on the specified variables out of a data of home 
insurance churners. 
3. Finally, the third model regresses full churn on the specified variables with the full 
sample of 24 230 movers. 
 
The experiments revealed variables indicating economic status to be important determinants of 
churn in all three experiments. Customer age and customership tenure (duration) were 
significant and considerable predictors, with older and more long-term customers being less 
likely to churn. In addition the presence of optional personal insurance as well as contact with 
one’s insurer prior to the address change significantly increased the probability of retention. 
 
The results of the experiments were significant and deemed to fit their respective data. The 
predictive power of the models (with the exception of Model 2) was quite small. This leads for 
the research to conclude that there exists some variable or variables affecting churn probabilities 
more than what is captured by the data used here. As the data does not account for prices, price 
changes or competitor activities it is reasonable to assume they would affect churn probabilities 
significantly. In Section 5.3 and finally in Chapter 6, conclusions and discussions are offered 
with critique of the work.  
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2. Insurance: History and Industry Overview 
 
More things might happen, than will happen. 
       Plato (427-347 BC) 
 
2.1. Uncertainty, risk and insurance 
When faced with uncertainty we as humans do not always act rationally (Hillson & Murray-
Webster 2007). The need for insurance is born from an individual’s aversion to risk. By 
definition, insurance is a contract with which the insured assumes a certain, smaller loss in 
exchange for a guarantee to be compensated for a greater, uncertain loss. This relation, as 
described by Vaughan (1996), can be written as follows:  
Buying insurance is choosing to lose a little at probability 1 over losing a lot at probability          
p <  1, i.e. the chance of the agreed upon risk being realized. The insurance business is based 
on the irrational nature of risk aversion, compounded by the asymmetric nature of information 
regarding risks. Assume an individual owns a house and wants to insure that house for in case 
it is destroyed by fire sometime in the future. The house is worth m amount of money. The 
guaranteed payment – the premium - made by the individual is set by the insurer and is denoted 
by y. In perfect competition, the premium is set at  
 𝑦 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑚 
Over one contract period, the insurer either gains y or loses y-m, depending on whether p0 is 
realized. As the contract period, i.e. a year, is renewed, the central limit theorem states the 
insurer’s profit would converge to zero.   
 
The irrationality Hillson & Murray-Webster discuss lends credibility to the idea that even in a 
setting of perfect and symmetric information between insurer and insured about risk p0, the 
insured would agree to a higher premium. The information, however, is not symmetric in 
practice. The correct value for p is impossible to know for certain in advance. This allows the 
insured and the insurer to have very different predictions of what p is. As the insurer has gained 
historical data from previous contracts on the actual realizations of p, it is reasonable to assume 
they have a more informed and accurate prediction of p. The premium is now being set as 
follows.    
𝑦 = 𝑝1 ∗ 𝑚 > 𝑝 ∗ 𝑚 
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Here, p1 represents the insurer’s assessment of p and p2 the same for the insured. As the insurer 
has better information than the insured, they know to set y at the highest possible p1 the insured 
will still accept, so long as p1 ≥ p0. Over one contract period, the insurer’s profit is again 
contingent on the stochastic nature of the risk, but over many contract periods, this premium 
would yield positive returns. Thus both irrationality when facing uncertainty and asymmetric 
information allow for insurance to be a profitable form of business for the insurer. Professor 
Howard Kunreuther and his co-authors describe the bi-polar nature of uncertainty in their 2013 
publication Insurance and Behavioral Economics (Kunreuther 2013). As is evident from the 
previous example, when the premium is set properly, it is crucial for the insurer to hold on to 
their customers for many contract periods in order to minimize noise.  
 
2.2. The insurance business model  
 
In traditional retail, the supplier knows what each unit of good has cost to produce and its goal 
is to sell each unit for a price that, at minimum, covers that cost (e.g. Varian 1987). If the only 
costs supplier A, a baker, has in production are two euros per bread and he can sell each bread 
for three euros, his profit earned grows with each bread sold.  
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑞 − 𝑐𝑞 
As c, the unit cost, is known to the baker, it is in their interest to sell as much as possible, as 
long as the price p in the market is greater than c.  
𝑞, 𝜋 → ∞, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  
𝑝 > 𝑐 
An insurer’s revenue is the premium paid by those insured. The insurance contract in itself is 
immaterial, it costs nothing to produce. The cost for the insurer arises, when an insured suffers 
a loss covered by the insurance contract. The request by the insured to be compensated is called 
a claim filed and the money moving from insurer to insured is called a claim paid. With these 
definitions, the insurer’s model of business in the form of the baker’s profit maximization 
equation, is 
 
Profit (π) = premium earned – (claims paid + overhead)1 
 
                                                 
1 The overhead for an insurer include e.g. employee compensation, rental expenses, etc. In this paper, overhead 
will be treated as a constant positive, and denoted by OC. 
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Insurers strive for profitability. When observing an insurance contract – a policy – over time, 
Vaughan (1996) defines that policy as having been profitable, if the above equation is positive. 
If the costs, on the other hand, exceeded the premium earned, the policy was unprofitable. In 
the example above, with the baker selling his bread, there is no uncertainty to the cost-side of 
the equation. The baker’s only concern is how many units he manages to sell. This is quite 
different from the insurer, as he cannot know in advance what the costs arising from a policy 
will be. Uncertainty is therefore not only the cause of the need for insurance, but also the thing 
that most separates the insurance business from traditional retail.  
 
Upon entering an insurance contract, the insurer does not know  
1. Whether the insured will suffer a claimable loss, or  
2. How great that loss would be.  
The price for the contract, the premium, is still agreed upon at the signing of the contract, so 
the best the insurer can do is use statistics and probability to forecast both 1 and 2 and set the 
premium accordingly, to remain profitable over time. Contrary to the baker, an increase in sold 
units does not always guarantee a better result. In the case of an unprofitable policy, it is quite 
the opposite – when a policy is priced too low relative to the risk, the insurer’s negative profit 
grows greater with each policy sold over time. An insurer’s performance cannot therefore be 
measured purely by revenue, as it says nothing of the costs. Instead, insurers are assessed by 
ratios that capture the cost-side of their business as well. Some key indicators are presented 
below, as defined by Vaughan (1996) and Finance Finland (2017).  
 Loss Ratio (LR, sometimes Claims ratio) divides the claims paid out during a period’s 
(often a year) time by the premium earned. LR = Claims paid / Premium earned 
 Cost Ratio (C, sometimes Expense ratio) captures the overhead (OC), as the premium 
earned must cover those costs as well. C = OC / Premium earned 
 Combined Ratio (CR) is the key indicator of an insurer’s performance. It combines 
both the loss ratio and the cost ratio and when it is below 1, business is profitable.           
CR = LR + C.     
Combined ratio yields an insurer’s result, sometimes referred to as the technical result. For 
reference, Figure 2.2.1 presents the Finnish P&C –market development according to these 
measures. 
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Figure 2.2. 1 The development of the Finnish P&C Insurance market. 
In 2016, the Finnish P&C market as a whole reported 4,25 billion euros of premium earned. 
The corresponding volume of claims paid was 3,06 billion euros. Overhead expenses were 0,87 
billion euros. These values add up to a combined ratio of 92,41 %, which in turn yields a 
positive result of 323 million euros for the market. Please refer to Figure 2.2.2 below. 
 
Premium 
earned 
Claims 
paid Expenses 
Loss 
ratio 
Cost 
ratio 
Combined 
ratio Result 
4255 3061 871 71.94 % 20.47 % 92.41 % 323 
Figure 2.2. 2 The Finnish P&C Insurance market key figures in 2016 (MEUR) 
 
 
An insurer, as any rational agent on the supply side of a market, maximizes their profit, i.e. their 
result. Result maximization is a delicate balance between increasing premium earned, without 
compromising the combined ratio. 
 
2.3. The insurance market from Antique times to modern Finland 
 
 
2.3.1. A brief history of insurance 
 
Vaughan (1996) traces the history of insurance back millennia, all the way to Antiquity. 
Chinese merchants would share risk by distributing the goods they were shipping on each 
other’s vessels. If one merchant’s boat would crash in the rapids, the loss would be spread out 
and shared by all, instead of being carried only by one unlucky individual. Although risk-
sharing techniques akin to the above example existed in the ancient world, modern insurance 
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business began to take shape only after the commercial revolution in Europe, following the 
crusades. 
 
Insurance is generally divided into two categories: personal (life and casualty) insurance and 
property-and-liability insurance. Personal insurance protects against financial loss in matters of 
life and health, whereas property and liability insurance safeguards individuals from costs 
arising from damages or peril to material possessions or assets. Modern property insurance has 
its roots in marine and fire insurance, originating in the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
respectively. Casualty insurance as we know it began to take shape centuries later, in the 1800s. 
 
Finland today categorizes insurance slightly differently, the main reason for this distinction is 
written in the Insurance Companies Act (2008). From distinguishing between personal and 
property, Finland divides insurance into life and non-life products. Life insurance is used to 
financially compensate beneficiaries of the insured in case the insured passes away. Non-life, 
also known as property and casualty (P&C) insurance, on the other hand consists of insurance 
covering not only property and liability, but also financial loss from health-related matters, 
death not-withstanding.  
 
2.3.2. The Finnish insurance market 
 
At the end of 2016, there were 52 licensed insurers operating in Finland, out of which 36 were 
property and casualty –specialized (P&C) companies, per Finance Finland (2017). Despite the 
relatively large number of suppliers, 99 % of the non-life premiums in the market in 2016 were 
written by only eight companies. Moreover, 81 % of the market was controlled by the three 
largest insurers: OP, LocalTapiola and If P&C.  
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Figure 2.2. 3 The market shares of Finnish P&C Insurers, 2016 
 
When a customer purchases an insurance policy to protect their assets or their self from 
financial loss, it is equivalent to saying the insurer and the insured agree upon and enter a 
contract. In Finland, by law, when a contract is entered, it is valid continuously until either party 
actively terminates it. At the point of purchase, the insurer and the insured agree to an annual 
premium, which is then charged every year, unless the insured decides to terminate the contract. 
The insurer may also terminate the contract for certain reasons, such as failure to pay the 
premium or based on underwriting-guidelines regarding the insured individual’s age. It is 
important to note that the insured may terminate the contract at any point in time, but the insurer 
may do the same only once per year, on what is called the date of renewal. 
32 %
26 %
23 %
10 %
3 %
2 % 2 %
2 %
Non-life insurance market shares by premium earned, 2016
OP Insurance Ltd
LocalTapiola Group
If P&C Ltd
Fennia Mutual
Turva Mutual
Pohjantähti Mutual
A-Insurance Ltd
Folksam Non-Life Ltd
Others
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2.3.3. Retention 
 
As previously discussed, the insurer maximizes result by managing both the premium earned 
and the combined ratio – in other words revenue and profitability. Revenue is generated from 
both individuals purchasing new policies but also existing policies being renewed at renewals. 
It is important to once again point out the importance of uncertainty when assessing 
profitability. As the price for the policy is agreed upon beforehand, the insurer relies on past 
experience, recorded data on not only the insurable asset or person (known as the exposure), 
but on the customer (insured, policyholder) as well. It is reasonable to say that assessing the 
risks related to a customer is made easier in the case of renewal, as the insurer already has data 
on the customer and the exposure at hand. A renewal also happens automatically, so renewing 
a policy for another year costs nothing to the insurer. Renewing policies – called retention – is 
therefore less risky and requires less effort on the insurer’s part, then creating revenue through 
new customers or policies. Many publications on retention (e.g Ahn et al 2006) have explicitly 
stated that retaining existing customers is cheaper than acquiring new ones. It is therefore 
crucially important for an insurance company to ensure profitably priced customers are 
retained. I will define some measures important to insurers, based on the nature of the Finnish 
insurance contract as well as the Insurance Contracts Act (1994). 
 Retention rate: Used to measure retaining of customers. As a single individual may 
have multiple policies purchased from the insurer, rates defined this way fails to capture 
those customers who only terminate one/some, but not all of their policies. Retention 
rate is always observed over a fixed-time and presented in a form akin to the examples 
listed here: 
Figure 2.2. 4 The Finnish insurance contract 
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o 12-month retention rate: A random anchor-date from the past is selected. All 
customers who have at least one valid insurance policy at that date are flagged. 
These flagged customers are observed exactly 12 months later, and those who 
still have at least one valid insurance policy are the ones who have been retained. 
The retained customers are then divided by the original flagged customers to 
generate the 12-month retention rate. 
 
12𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
𝑁𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑁𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
 
o First year retention rate: First year retention is calculated by looking back 
exactly one year. Out of all new customers who bought their first policy one 
year ago to the day, the ones who still have at least one policy valid are the 
retained ones. The number of retained customers is divided by all the new 
customers entering a contract exactly one year ago. 
 
1𝑠𝑡 𝑦𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
𝑁𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 12𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑜
𝑁𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 12𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑜
 
 
2.4 Churn 
 
As the law states, a customer is free to terminate an insurance policy at any time, which means 
that every customer poses a flight risk at all times. When such risk is realized and the customer 
terminates their contract with the insurer, it is said that the customer has churned. The traditional 
definition of churn in a subscription-based service model is as simple as it is described above. 
If a customer continues their subscription at some observation period, the firm has retained that 
customer. On the other hand, if another customer no longer subscribes at that same observation 
period, the customer is said to have churned. It is important to note that in the Finnish insurance 
market, customers often have more than one policy purchased from an insurer. This leads us to 
create a distinction between partial churn and complete churn. 
 
If a customer terminates all of their existing contracts, leaving no policy subscriptions 
active, we say that customer has churned completely (or fully).  
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If a customer terminates at least one of their existing contracts, leaving at least one 
policy subscription active, we say that customer has partially churned. 
 
Retention analysis should account for both for the following reason: focusing only on complete 
churn will not capture the entire decrease in revenue. Consider an extreme example where all 
customers have two subscriptions with an insurer and all policies cost the same. Now consider 
all customers cancel one of their two policies, leaving one active. If we were to measure 
retention simply with the definition of complete churn, the firm’s retention would appear to be 
100 %, yet the revenue received from premiums would drop to half from the previous period.  
For this reason, the models constructed in this thesis will account for both partial churn and full 
churn. 
 
Improving retention is synonymous with decreasing churn. When each customer is free to churn 
at any point in time, it is useful to look for spikes in churn rates. What kind of events precede 
churn? What connects churning customers? To be able to take action in improving retention, 
one must know who the customers are that decide to leave and why they decide to do so. 
Following these thoughts, Chapter 3 presents the research problem. Chapter 4 presents theory 
and Chapter 5 the empiric models to solve said problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
3  Research problem: Churn among movers 
 
We now know that managing churn is as, if not more, important to result maximization as new 
customer acquisition. As churning can happen literally at any point during a year, it is 
reasonable to assume retention rates remain quite stable regardless of the anchor date. A valid 
question to ask is whether there exists a common event – some experience or activity around 
which churn rates have increased. This chapter presents the move event (moving from one 
address to another) as a Finnish phenomenon, around which churn-rates in subscription-based 
services, such as insurance, tend to spike. A study conducted by the Finnish Postal service (Posti 
2016) is presented, and the research question is formed based on that study. This thesis asks 
what are the characteristics and experiences for moving customers that indicate an increased 
probability to churn.   
 
3.1. The move event 
 
According to Posti (2016), 700 000 households move homes each year, with those households 
consisting of approximately one million individuals. This represents roughly 18 % of the 
Finnish population. Moving is reported and recorded as a change of home address to the Finnish 
Postal Service (henceforth Posti). Since Posti is the official authority receiving the reports of 
moving, it is a reliable source of movers-related data.  
 
Close to one in every five Finns moving within a year seems like a high volume. Why do Finns 
move so often? Posti (2017b) offers the economic environment to be a reason. In years of 
recession 2008 and 2009, when the GDP growth rate shrank from 5,2 % to -8,3 %, around 
650 000 households reported an address change. Years 2015 and 2016 however, when GDP 
growth rate increased from -0,6 % to 1,9 %, saw annual moving numbers of 710 000 and 
720 000 respectively – a growth of nearly 11 %. 2 The high volume of movers is driven mainly 
by individuals under the age of 30 (53 %) and 61 % of movers moved into apartment buildings. 
(Posti 2017b). 
 
                                                 
2 GDP figures from Official Statistics of Finland (OSF) (2016).  Annual national accounts [e-publication]. 
ISSN=1798-0623. 2016. Helsinki: Statistics Finland [referred: 9.12.2017]. 
Access method: http://www.stat.fi/til/vtp/2016/vtp_2016_2017-07-13_tie_001_en.html 
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Posti (2016, 2017a) offers the data most relevant to subscription-providers, such as insurers. 
An address change means that one must actively update their address-tied subscriptions, such 
as electricity, internet and home insurance. The discontinuation in the subscription, caused by 
the move creates an increased risk of churn. This is intuitive. A property of continuous services 
such as insurance or internet, is that a consumer does not actively consider them on a daily 
basis. When faced with an event where it is necessary to re-visit your subscriptions and one is 
again presented with the prices of those services, it is reasonable to consider competitors’ 
offerings as well. “Tendering your subscriptions” has become customary whenever an address 
change is imminent. Posti knows this and does business with the insights they have on movers. 
As was touched on in Chapter 1, Posti provides marketing visibility and leads on moving 
customers for businesses looking to either protect their own moving customers and/or win 
movers over from competitors. When testing the online change-of-address service on Posti’s 
website, it is evident most if not all electricity and insurance providers have taken advantage of 
these services. It is reasonable to assume this is another factor in the high churn rates around 
the moving date. 
 
This intuition is backed by data. Data provided by Finnish Insurer X shows that when the 
moving date is set as the anchor date, 30-day churn rates are multiplied, than when measured 
on a random arbitrary anchor date. To the insurer, this means that (assuming the mass of movers 
is distributed among companies according to market share) 18 % of customers present a 
common, drastically increased risk of churning at some point during a year. 
 
3.2. Who churn and why? 
 
The insurance customers with an increased risk of churning, the movers, have a defining 
characteristic in common: they change addresses while moving houses. However most things 
are very different from mover to mover, not least of which the outcome of the move in regard 
to retention. Some choose to continue their subscription with their original insurer, while some 
choose to churn and select another insurer. Why? Analyzing customer data on characteristics 
and experiences should provide additional insight into what connects churners to one another 
and what separates them from non-churners. This thesis asks whether customer data can be 
used to accurately predict those insurance policyholders who, when triggered by an address 
change, would choose to churn and choose another insurer. If the answer is “yes”, then naturally 
it is of interest to find the characteristics and events in a customer’s profile that significantly 
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either increase or decrease the probability to churn. The following chapter presents the 
theoretical basis for answering that question, detailing past work on modeling choice between 
discrete alternatives.  Chapter 5 details the econometric process and its results. 
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4  Theory review: Discrete choice modeling 
 
 
Discrete choice modeling is a relatively young field of economic study. It was developed into 
its modern form in the latter half of the 20th century by econometricians trying to answer 
questions in travel and transportation analysis. The foundation of their work, however, can be 
traced back to some of the more fundamental results in microeconomics, such as the classical 
theory of the consumer. In this chapter I present some of the notable research done on discrete 
choice. Along with the different approaches and models applied to economic problems today, 
I will begin by reviewing some of the groundwork upon which economists such as Daniel 
McFadden and Kenneth Train began to model and predict individual consumer choice among 
discrete alternatives. Finally I present some contemporary applications of choice theory into 
churn problems, most notably Madden et al’s (1999) study of subscriber churn in the Australian 
ISP market.   
 
 
4.1  From utility to modern churn models 
 
In 1985 Moshe Ben Akiva and Steven Lerman described discrete choice analysis as modeling 
an individual’s choice from a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive alternatives 
(Ben Akiva & Lerman 1985). A continuous choice problem asks how much you will choose 
from a continuous consumption set, an example of which is the open set (0,1). A discrete choice 
problem rather poses the question of “which one?” or “how many?” will you choose from, for 
example, the set {1, 2, 3}. 
 
Understanding and rationalizing decisions made by an individual facing discrete alternatives 
has been the subject of study by economists and psychologists alike. A natural starting point in 
studying choice is to ask why one thing is chosen over something else. It is a cornerstone of 
microeconomics that a sensible individual will choose the alternative that yields him more 
satisfaction, or utility, than any other available alternative. This concept of a consumer selecting 
the alternative with the highest resulting utility can be found already in some of the very first 
works on mathematical economics, such as William Jevons’ opus, The Theory of Political 
Economy (Jevons 1871). With mathematical tools being introduced, it became relevant to 
measure and give values to utility levels. Building on the work by Jevons, Vilfredo Pareto 
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proposed in 1906 the concept of ordinal utility. Ordinal utility states that merely the rankings 
of utilities matter, not the actual values. Consider an individual making a choice between two 
alternatives a and b. If the utility resulting from consuming a is greater than that of consuming 
b, i.e. 
𝑢(𝑎) > 𝑢(𝑏) 
then we say the individual prefers a to b  𝑎 ≻ 𝑏. Consider now that we know 
 𝑢(𝑎) = 8, 𝑢(𝑏) = 4 
Ordinal utility states that knowing the respective values of utilities gives us no more insight to 
the individual’s preferences, than what we already had. We can still only state that 𝑎 ≻ 𝑏, but  
nothing of the intensities of preference (Pareto 1906).  
 
With the framework established, economists began to examine ways of using the utility 
maximizing consumer to model market-level behavior. The most notable way of aggregating 
consumer choice was to use an individual’s demand to represent the population. James E. 
Hartley presents and critiques this method, called the representative agent, as having roots in 
Alfred Marshall’s representative firm theory first introduced in 1890. All variations from the 
representative agent in observations among individuals were represented by an additive 
disturbance, i.e. an error term. The variation was attributed rather to measurement errors than 
unobserved factors in individual agents. Hartley argues that it is extremely hard to give a 
consistent and empirically usable definition of what a representative individual is like, stating 
that no representative agent can model heterogeneity (Hartley, 1996). The representative agent 
model is presented below. 
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4.1.1  The representative agent model (McFadden 2000) 
Consider a consumer whose preferences are represented by 𝑢(𝒙), where x is a vector of 
consumption levels of various goods. The consumer maximizes this utility subject to a budget 
constraint 𝒑𝒙 ≤ 𝑤, where p is a vector of prices and w is the consumer’s income.  
The consumer’s demand function is then: 
𝒙 = 𝑑(𝑤, 𝒑) 
The market level demand is 
𝒙 = 𝑑(𝑤, 𝒑) + 𝜀 
where 𝜀 is the disturbance added to account for variation among observations. 
 
 
As critique of the representative agent grew, focus turned to the heterogeneity of preferences. 
Preferences vary, because individuals value different attributes in commodities. This 
understanding, along with a rapidly growing availability of individual consumer data paved 
way for more accurate modeling of individual choice. Econometrician Daniel McFadden, 
whose work serves as the theoretical basis for the upcoming experiment, won the Nobel Prize 
in 2000 for his pioneering work in modeling discrete choice. In his prize lecture, he summarized 
the idea upon which choice analysis is based as follows: 
 
“The heart of the standard or rational model of economics is the idea that consumers seek 
to maximize innate, stable preferences whose domain is the vector of quantities and 
attributes of the commodities they consume.” (McFadden 2000) 
 
McFadden approached discrete choice from a transport economist’s perspective. In his 1981 
paper Econometric Models of Probabilistic Choice he presents an example of binomial discrete 
choice: the choice of commuting to work by car or by bus. Upon this example, Madden, Savage 
and Coble-Neal (1999) applied discrete choice theory to a churn probability model in the 
Australian internet service provider (ISP) market. As established in chapter 2, internet services 
are similar to modern Finnish insurance policies in the sense that both are continuous 
subscriptions that can be terminated by the customer at any moment. The paper by Madden et 
al therefore functions as an appropriate, scientific basis for creating a churn model for an 
insurer. Ahn et al (2006) and Kim (2004) constructed churn models in a similar way to 
McFadden in the Korean mobile communications industry. 
 24 
Whether to churn is a choice an insured customer makes between two discrete alternatives – 
staying or churning. The choice, as presented by Madden et al (1999), originally proposed by 
McFadden (1974), depends on the customer’s characteristics and their valuation of the insurer’s 
attributes. Policies are continuous, as explained in Chapter 2, so every moment of every day the 
subscription continues, is in fact the customer making a choice to stay. This is rather abstract, 
as it is quite obvious individuals do not make a conscious decision to stay with their insurer 
each moment of each day. We are, however, studying a sample of customers with a very distinct 
event in their customership – the event of moving homes. Because an address change effectively 
terminates the home insurance policy linked to the old address, the moving customer is in fact 
faced with a decision between two alternatives – to continue with my current insurer at my new 
address, or churn and start a policy with some other insurer. Following Madden et al. closely, 
we can formally state the customer’s problem. The decision can be modeled by defining the nth 
customer’s satisfaction with their existing insurer, insurer j, with the customer’s available 
characteristics (sn) and j’s measured attributes (zj,n). The indirect utility function takes the form: 
 
𝑈𝑗,𝑛 = 𝑈(𝑧𝑗,𝑛, 𝑠𝑛),    j = {churn, stay} 
 
A customer’s probability to churn is equivalent to the probability that selecting a new insurer 
while changing the address would yield them higher utility than staying. Or: 
 
𝑃(𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛|𝑗) = 𝑃(𝑈𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛,𝑛 > 𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦,𝑛) 
 
The model by Madden et al, relates a binary variable (churn = 1, stay = 0) to the measured 
characteristics and attributes in a logistic regression (as detailed in Figure 4.1.2): 
 
𝑃𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛,𝑛 =
𝑒  𝛽𝑥𝑗,𝑛
′
 
 
1 + 𝑒  𝛽𝑥𝑗,𝑛
′  
𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦,𝑛 =
1
1 + 𝑒  𝛽𝑥𝑗,𝑛
′  
Where Pj,n is the probability of churn for the n
th customer and x’j,n is the vector of measured z 
and s for j and n, respectively. β represents the parameters to be estimated. This model yields 
weights and significances for the attributes and characteristics used as regressors in the model. 
(Cox 1958). Barring statistically insignificant results or a poor goodness of fit of the model, 
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results from an experiment such as this can be used to identify and segment moving customers 
based on churn risk, to prioritize customer saving activities accordingly. 
Modern discrete choice modeling can therefore be interpreted as using individual data on 
characteristics and preferences to give individuals a probability of choosing something.  
 
Figure 4.1.2  The binomial logistic regression model, proposed by Cox (1958) and applied 
by McFadden (1974) 
Consider Yi to be a binary process. Then Y1,..,Yn are random variables, each taking either the 
value “1” or “0”.  
Let x1…,xn be a set of fixed numbers. 
In the simple form of the binomial problem, we suspect xi to have a relation with the probability 
of Yi = 1, denoted here as µi. The linear relation between µi and xi would be 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) = 𝜇𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖 
A linear relation would produce unusable estimates, as µi is a probability and thus must fall 
between 0 and 1. By the logistic law we have 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝜇𝑖 =  log {
𝜇𝑖
(1 − 𝜇𝑖)
}
 
= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖 
Further, 
𝜇𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) =
𝑒𝛼+𝛽𝑥𝑖
1 + 𝑒𝛼+𝛽𝑥𝑖
 
And  
(1 − 𝜇𝑖) = 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 0) =
1
1 + 𝑒𝛼+𝛽𝑥𝑖
 
 
Estimates of βi can therefore be interpreted as the proportional change in the log-odds of 
“success” in the binary process. For the proportional change in the true probability, the operation 
exp(?̂?) must be performed. 
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5  Empirical application: Modeling churn in the Finnish insurance market 
 
This chapter presents the application of discrete choice theory into practice to answer the 
research problem presented in Chapter 3, i.e. which customer characteristics and preferences 
imply an increased risk to churn at the time of moving homes. A sample of customer data 
(provided by Finnish Insurer X) is used in the experiments. Section 5.1. presents and discusses 
the data in detail, along with justifications for data manipulation and cleaning. In 5.2., the 
binomial logistic regression model is constructed as described in the previous chapter and its 
results presented. Altogether three experiments are conducted to find significances for: 
1. Characteristics and preferences indicating an increased probability to change their home 
insurance. 
2. Characteristics and preferences among those who change their home insurance, 
indicating complete churn. 
3. Characteristics and preferences indicating complete churn in the mass of moving 
customers. 
 
Finally, 5.3. presents model evaluation along with discussion of the results. 
 
5.1. The Data  
 
The data used in this thesis was kindly provided for modeling by a Finnish insurer, henceforth 
known as Insurer X. It is a sample of the insurer’s customer data, consisting of information the 
insurer registers and stores about each individual and their customer history over time. 
Important note: the test sample has been cleaned of all identifiable personal and company 
information. The reason for this being the protection of the customers’ data privacy as well as 
the insurer’s private, business-sensitive data.  
 
The sample was created as follows: all such customers who filed a change of address during 
the year 2016 were selected in the sample.3 This sampling method ensures that the individuals 
selected are in fact those who were customers before moving, but in no way discriminates based 
on whether a customer chose to remain or churn after the move. The 90 day –window is 
                                                 
3 Definition of customer: “an individual with a valid contract for at least one valid insurance policy 90 days 
before the date of reported change of address” 
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arbitrary and is in place to ensure as much of the effect of moving on churn is captured. The 
columns include variables available to the insurer, depicting customer characteristics and 
preferences, with the aim of capturing similar characteristics and preferences Madden et al 
(1999) obtained by survey.  
 
 The sampling yielded 50 000 observations. Each observation – or row – represents an 
individual customer. The variables – or columns – are customer characteristics or historical 
nodes of information having been accrued over the length of each individual’s time as a 
customer. There are altogether 21 variables. They range from demographics, such as age group 
to very detailed information related to experiences as a customer, such as “how many visits has 
the customer made to the online service in the last 45 days before sampling?”.  Table 5.1.1 
presents the variables in categories, as Madden et al (1999) did, along with explanations.  
 
As established in Chapter 3, moving homes leads to an individual having to take action on their 
home insurance. Therefore our data should only include such customers who had an active 
home insurance 90 days prior to the registered change of address. Our original data, N, 
contained 50 000 observations. Figure 5.1.1 presents data set N as a union of three subsets – X, 
Y and Z, where each subset contains observations with at least one active insurance policy in 
the three lines of business - property, motor and personal – respectively.  
 
𝑁 = 𝑋 ∪ 𝑌 ∪ 𝑍 
 
With this definition, our dataset of interest is the subset O ϲ 𝑁, so that 
𝑂 = 𝑋 ∪ (𝑋 ∩ 𝑌) ∪ (𝑋 ∩ 𝑍) ∪ (𝑋 ∩ 𝑌 ∩ 𝑍). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The subset O consists of 24 230 observations.  
a b c 
5.1. 1 The subsetting of data from N to O 
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ECONOMIC (preference)     
payment_plan categorical 
Customers choice of payment installments: 1, 2, 
3, 4, 6 
nr_lob_motor_90_days_ago categorical 
Number of motor objects: "0", "1-2", "3-4" and 
"5+" 
nr_lob_property_90_days_ago categorical 
Number of property objects: "SINGLE" and 
"MULTIPLE" 
nr_lob_personal_90_days_ago categorical 
Number of personal objects: "0", "1", "2" and 
"3+" 
      
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
(characteristics)     
age_group categorical 
Age of customer: "under27", "28-38", "39-50", 
"51-64", "65+" 
Gndr_Cd categorical Gender of customer. Binary "MALE" / "FEMALE" 
      
USAGE (preference)     
Web_visits_last_45_days numeric Customers visits to insurer's digital platforms. 
Ctc_email categorical 
Has customer given consent to receive e-mail? 
"YES"/"NO" 
Ctc_phone categorical 
Has customer given consent to receive call? 
"YES"/"NO" 
number_of_inbound_calls_90d numeric 
How many x the customer has called the insurer 
over 90 days 
Ins_Polcy_Dlv_Cd categorical Document delivery method: digital or paper. 
duration categorical 
Customership length / tenure. "1 yr", "2  yrs", 
"3-5", "5-10", "10+" 
      
EXPERIENCE (preference)     
tm_contacted categorical 
Has the customer received a call in the last 
90d? "YES" / "NO" 
Customer_Commented_Eff categorical 
Has the customer commented on a CX-survey for 
effort "YES" / "NO" 
Customer_Commented_Imp categorical Same as above, but for improvement "YES" / "NO" 
CX_forms_answered_last_90d numeric 
How many CX-forms the customer has answered to 
the last 90 days. 
CX_forms_received_last_90d numeric 
How many CX-forms the customer has received the 
last 90 days. 
DMs_last_90d numeric 
How many pieces of marketing mail the customer 
has received the last 90 days 
eDMs_last_90d numeric 
How many pieces of marketing e-mail the customer 
has received 90d. 
5.1. 2 The 19 regressors to be used in initial Experiments 1-3. 
 
 
5.1.1 Notes on variable manipulation and combining 
 
The initial data set combined a larger number of variables than what is detailed in Table 5.1.1. 
Some were disregarded right away because of missing values accounting for more than 90 % 
of the observations (with no significance on churn in the remaining observations) and some 
were bundled to create new categorical variables. This section details the key manipulations 
that were conducted in order to create more accurate models, the R-code to which is found in 
the Appendix. 
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The variable payment_plan is a categorical variable with five levels – “1”, “2,”, “3”, “4” and 
“6” – each indicating the customer’s choice of payment installments. It is created by combining 
five separate numeric variables denoting the number of bills with said installment option the 
customer has. 
 
Duration is a categorical variable denoting the length of the customer’s tenure at their current 
provider. It has five levels “1 yr”, “2 yrs”, “3-5 yrs”, “5-10 yrs” and “10+ yrs”. The original 
variable was a numeric variable indicating how many days a customership has been active. 
 
The variables indicating the size of a customer’s insurance portfolio - “nr_lob_[lob 
here]_90_days_ago” – were originally numeric variables, the values of which indicated the 
number of active policies a customer had in that line of business. Using these numeric variables 
as regressors yielded absurd results caused by, as it turns out, Insurer X:s way of accounting 
for policies. For example the variable indicating the amount of property products (i.e. home 
insurance) the customer had, contained by far the most observations at value 4, with only a 
fraction at 1-3 (Figure 5.1.1). This is because a standard home insurance contains four covers. 
In our data, four “objects” make one product. Due to this, the variable was converted to 
categorical type, with observations ≤ 4 being registered at level “SINGLE”, while all those > 4 
registered as “MULTIPLE”. A similar conversion was done for LOBs personal and motor. 
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5.2. The Models 
 
After manipulation and cleaning, the sample now consists of xxxx observations with xx 
variables. Per Madden et al (1999), a binomial probit model is used to relate the probability of 
a customer leaving their insurer with variables depicting economic and demographic customer 
characteristics as well as those depicting customer experience and preferences (usage). The full 
list of variables along with explanations is provided in Table xx. From Chapter 4, the model is 
written as: 
𝑃𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑛,𝑛 =
𝑒  𝛽𝑥𝑗,𝑛
′
 
 
1 + 𝑒  𝛽𝑥𝑗,𝑛
′  
 
Chapter 3 detailed the distinction between partial and complete churn. The move event may 
cause the customer to either continue with their existing insurer, choose to churn partially 
(only changing home insurance) or churn completely. Figure 5.2.1 depicts partial churners (A) 
and complete churners (B) as subsets of the set O. Further, it is also true that in this case B is a 
subset of A. 
 
𝐵 ϲ 𝐴 ϲ 𝑂 
5.1. 3 The distribution of observations by property products in the 
original variable 
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In order to appropriately capture these different layers of customer behavior, altogether three 
experiments are performed. They are defined as follows: 
 
Experiment 1: 𝑃(𝐴|𝑂) 
Which characteristics and preferences significantly affect a moving customer 
choosing to terminate their existing home insurance in favor of a competitor? 
 
This is conducted by regressing the binary variable home_churn on our regressors depicting 
characteristics and preferences, with the dataset O in a logistic regression model. 
 
Experiment 2: 𝑃 (𝐵|𝐴) 
Which characteristics and preferences significantly affect a partially churned 
customer’s probability of churning completely? 
 
This is conducted by regressing the binary variable cust_churned on our regressors, with the 
dataset A in a logistic regression model. 
 
Experiment 3: 𝑃 (𝐵|𝑂) 
Which characteristics and preferences significantly affect a moving customer 
choosing to completely churn? 
 
This is conducted by regressing the binary variable cust_churned on our regressors, with the 
dataset O in a logistic regression model. 
 
Figure 5.2. 1  The data used in Experiments 1-3 
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5.2.1. Results: Experiment 1 
 
Let the output yielded by Experiment 1 be known as Model 1. The first regression was 
performed with all relevant variables (21) as regressors. Model speficiation is conducted by 
variance analysis, removing non-significant variables that do not cause a decrease in residual 
deviance. The anova –table is available in the Appendix. After specification, the regression was 
performed again with 11 significant predictors. The results of the specified model are presented 
below, in Figure 5.2.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The estimated coefficient for nr_lob_property_90_days_ago_SINGLE (0.3941) indicates direct 
proportionality with the home-churn probability. This implies – at the 99.9 % level - that 
customers with more than one policy in the property line of business are less likely to churn 
than those with a single home insurance.4 There are two logical explanations to this: 
1. Changing your home insurance from one insurer to another is quick. It is reasonable to 
assume that customers with multiple homes (and/or pets) won’t want to go to the trouble 
                                                 
4 An example of having more than one property item is when a customer has insured their summer home (and/or 
pet) in addition to their home. 
Figure 5.2. 2  -  The results of a specified Model 1. 
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quite so lightly as the amount of time and effort required increases with the number of 
policies. 
2. The amount of property insured can be viewed as an indicator for customer wealth. 
Those with fewer belongings to insure might be more price sensitive than those with 
many, and can therefore be more susceptible to move their home insurance if a cheaper 
alternative is presented by a competitor. 
 
Explanation 1 also holds true for the number of personal line products a customer has. 
Customers with two personal line products see their log-probability of churn drop by a factor 
0.273 and those with three or more by 0.385 (at the 99.9 % level), when compared to customers 
with no personal line products. Where a high number of property products can be reasonably 
argued to imply wealth, it is not as evident with personal insurance. There is, however, another 
explanation for personal products’ positive effect on retention. – Explanation 3.  
 
3. Most personal line products, such as health and life insurance, require a thorough risk 
selection process before the contract may be started, in order to understand the potential 
customer’s health history. The process may result in certain pre-existing conditions 
being ruled out of the product’s coverage. This means that moving a health or life 
insurance from one insurer to another will quite often result in poorer coverage in the 
new product. 
In summation, Explanation 1 implies that the more policies a customer has with their insurer, 
the less likely they are to churn their home insurance when it’s time to move homes. 
Explanation 2 states that a high number of property products implies a low probability for home 
insurance churn whereas Explanation 3 states the same for products in the personal line.  It is 
noteworthy that the amount of motor products in itself is not significant at the 10 %-level. 5  
 
Older customers, as well as customers with a longer tenure (captured by the duration –variable) 
seem to have a lower churn probability. An individual with a customership ten years or longer 
sees their log-odds of churning reduced by 0.3142 when compared to a first-year customer at 
the 99.9 % level. Similarly, a customer over the age of 65 presents log-odds of churning reduced 
by 0.695, when compared to one under the age of 38. 
                                                 
5 Possible explanation: the main motor product (third party liability) is a regulated, statutory insurance. It is 
much easier to change motor insurance providers online than it is property or personal.  
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Premium is paid by the customer to the insurer in advance. The customer may choose to either 
pay the annual premium all at once, or break it down into smaller installments of either 2, 3, 4 
or 6. Customers paying in six installments present a churn probability increase of 0.2315 in 
comparison to those paying in one sitting (at the 99.9 % level). Preferring to pay in many 
installments over just one may indicate price sensitivity, similarly to the way the customer’s 
number of policies did.   
 
The estimates indicate positive relationship between retention and customer communications. 
Telephone calls to the insurer’s customer service as well as digitally sent communications to 
the customer decrease the probability of home insurance churn (at 95 % and 90 % levels, 
respectively). Web visits done by the customer over 45 days prior to the reported address 
change, however, increase the probability of home insurance churn at the 95 % level. Finally, 
females are more likely to move their home insurance than men, as evidenced by significance 
of the Gndr_Cd variable at the 90 % level. 
 
5.2.2. Results: Experiment 2 
 
Let the output produced by Experiment 2 be known as Model 2. Model 2 estimates the 
magnitude and significance of variables causing customers who change their home insurance 
to churn completely. It is important to note that the process of churning completely is not 
necessarily done in one sitting - changing providers may take days, even weeks. As the address 
change forces a customer to make the churn/stay –decision, it is not unreasonable to assume 
they would make that decision first, before beginning the process of assessing other policies 
they might have active. The fact that a moving customer choosing to change home insurance 
providers does not yet necessarily know whether they will churn completely or not lends 
credibility to the possibility that the results in Models 1, 2 and 3 may differ. 
 
The data used in this model is the subset A (Figure 5.2.1), containing 4 891 observations. The 
subset is obtained by sampling from the set O, only selecting rows where the binary variable 
home_churn_all takes the value “1”. The first step is to again conduct the regression with all 
21 variables. The model is specified by way of variance analysis - as in Experiment 1 – to only 
include significant variables. The specified model included 12 variables, results of which are 
 35 
presented in Figure 5.2.3. The table of variance analysis is for the unspecified model is available 
in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 2 estimates the effect of owning multiple policies to have a similarly positive effect on 
retention as did Model 1, with the addition of the presence of products in the motor line of 
business showing significance at the 99.9 % level. The variable depicting customership tenure 
behaves in a similar way to Model 1, but age_group presents an interesting result. In Model 1, 
older age implied a lower probability of home insurance churn. However according to Model 
2, out of customers who change home insurance providers, those over the age of 65 have 
significantly increased log-odds of churning completely (0.8068 at the 99.9 % level) in 
comparison to the age 28-38 –segment. Further, customers under the age of 27 have higher 
Figure 5.2. 3  -  The results of a specified Model 2 
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odds of retention (given a churned home insurance), than any other age group (-0.2115 at the 
95 % level). These findings can be interpreted as older customers preferring to insure everything 
with one provider, whereas the young segment does not mind insurance cover scattered across 
multiple insurers. 
 
 A notable addition to the regressors in Model 2 when compared to Model 1 is the significance 
of the variable tm_contacted. Out of customers who changed home insurance providers, those 
who had received a telephone call from their original insurer no longer than 90 days prior were 
far less likely to churn completely than those who had not (tm_contactedYES: -0.6155 at 99.9 
% significance level). Gender of the customer as well as the preference of payment installations 
lose significance going from Model 1 to Model 2. 
  
5.2.3 Results: Experiment 3 
 
Let the output yielded by Experiment 3 be known as Model 3. Model 3 estimates the magnitudes 
and significances of the effects variables have on complete customer churn. Our dataset is the 
full set O, out of whom set B are the customers for whom the binary variable cust_churned 
takes the value “1”. Model 1 focused on what causes movers to change home insurance 
providers and Model 2 looked at what made home insurance churners choose to churn 
completely. Model 3 can therefore be seen as a validation experiment for the relationship 
between home insurance churn and complete churn; if the results are significantly different, we 
want to understand why. Dataset O consists of 24 230 observations with 24 columns of 
variables. Specification is performed by variance analysis and non-significant variables are 
removed. The estimation results of a specified Model 3, with 9 significant regressors, are 
presented in Figure 5.2.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age and customership tenure affect full churn in a similar manner to Model 1, with older age 
and longer tenure lowering the churn probability. The variables with the largest estimates are 
the variables indicating insurance portfolio size. Customers with multiple products from the 
personal and motor lines of business have substantially better log-odds of survival, than those 
with none. A telephone contact – initiated either by the customer or the insurer – results in an 
improved probability of being retained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. 4  The results of a specified Model 3 
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5.3. Interpretation and discussion of results 
 
This section combines the results of the three models and offers interpretation. Statistics 
depicting accuracy and predictive power are offered along with discussion thereof.  
 
 
5.3.1 Model evaluation 
 
  MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
McFadden R2 0.029  0.280  0.103 
AUC 0.601 0.793 0.722 
χ2 696.24*** 1898.4*** 1130.5*** 
5.3. 1  Statistics depicting goodness of fit and accuracy of Models 1, 2 and 3 
 
The results described in section 5.2 describe the intensities and significances of the relationships 
between churn and customer variables. What has not yet been discussed, are the answers to the 
following questions:  
1. How much of the variance in our churn variables does our data explain? 
2. How accurately do our models predict the correct outcome regarding churn? 
Figure 5.3.1 offers help. The first row describes model accuracy via a statistic denoted here as 
McFadden R2. McFadden (1974) proposed that a traditional R2 index is not as well behaved for 
models using maximum likelihood estimation – such as our logit models – as it is for ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimation. The statistic used here is a so-called pseudo-R2, meant to be 
interpreted in the same way as the traditional measure. A higher value of McFadden’s R2 
indicates a model that fits, i.e. explains the variation, better than a model with a lower value 
(Hemmert et al 2016).  
 
Though McFadden (1974) argued his pseudo-R2 –measure should always be expected to be 
lower in value than its more traditional counterpart, it can be said that none of the three models 
fit their respective data very well. Model 2, whose data consists only of customers having 
already churned their home insurance, displays the best indication of accuracy at 28 %.  
 
The middle row provides another way by which to evaluate the predictive power of the model. 
The area under curve (AUC) statistic describes how accurately a model can predict a binary 
outcome correctly. (Allison 2014). Figure 5.3.2 presents the curves in question, known as the 
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receiver operating characteristic –curves. The curve plots together the true and false positive 
rates – a curve closer to the top left of the box implies greater accuracy. The AUC-statistic 
provides insight very similar to McFadden’s R2. The model used for home insurance churn 
(Model 1) does not fit its data particularly well (i.e. does not have great predictive power). 
Model 3 does slightly better in identifying complete churners from the mass of movers, but the 
most accurate model is Model 2, predicting complete churn correctly in close to 80 % of cases, 
where home insurance has been churned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3. 2  The ROC curves of Models 1, 2 and 3 
 40 
The bottom row displays the resulting statistic for conducting a Likelihood Ratio Test on each 
model. The high value of the χ2 –statistics means that we reject the null hypothesis of the set of 
coefficients not being significantly different from zero at the 99.9 % level (Madden et al 1999). 
In other words, the model is deemed to fit the data. 
 
Of importance is that these findings do not undermine the results obtained in section 5.2. Rather, 
it can be said there exists a variable not captured by the data that significantly affects the 
decision to churn. An explanation is proposed in the following section. 
 
 
5.3.2 Interpreting the results 
 
Figure 5.3.3 summarizes key columns from the regression results of Models 1, 2 and 3, while 
reporting the exponent of the estimated coefficients. This means that for each variable, the 
actual estimates for the probability effects are reported respectively under each model in the 
column “exp(estimate)”.   
 
From Figure 5.3.3 it can be seen that the most influential variables affecting both home 
insurance- and complete churn among moving customers are the length of customership tenure 
(duration) and the presence of personal insurance products. From Model 1, we see that a 
moving customer most likely to change home insurance providers is young, with only one home 
insured, paying premium in multiple installments. 
 
Differing greatly from Models 1 and 3, Model 2 suggests older customers are actually 
significantly more likely to churn completely, given a changed home insurance. A telephone 
contact made by the insurer has no effect on home insurance churn, but is a significant mitigator 
of complete customer churn. Electronic communications seem to have no significant effects on 
churn. In general a smaller insurance portfolio and paying in multiple installments indicate a 
higher churn probability. On the other hand, recent telephone communications and longer 
customership tenure affect retention in a positive way.  
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5.3. 3 5.3. 3 Actual factors by which churn probabilities are affected + significances for Models 1, 2 and 3 
 
 
 
From the previous chapter we obtained that however insightful these findings are, they explain 
only a fraction of the variance in our churn variables. It is implied there should exist such a 
variable (or variables) not captured by our data, that would help explain the decision to churn 
in a significant way. The experiments conducted in 5.2 differ from previous work by not having 
price or competitor-related variables in our data. In Madden et al (1999) the most significant 
reason for churn as reported by customers was the price of internet access. It is reasonable to 
  MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
  home churn on full data full churn on home churners full churn on full data 
VARIABLE exp(estimate) significance exp(estimate) significance exp(estimate) significance 
             
duration 10+ 0.730 *** 0.425 *** 0.559 *** 
duration 2 1.008   0.848   1.019   
duration 3-5 0.880 * 0.587 *** 0.779 ** 
duration 5-10 0.890 ' 0.502 *** 0.641 *** 
age 39-50 0.794 *** 1.014   0.783 ** 
age 51-64 0.623 *** 1.036   0.607 *** 
age 65+ 0.499 *** 2.242 *** 0.548 *** 
age under27 0.509   0.810 * 0.935   
Ctc_email YES 1.217 ** -   -   
CX_forms_90d -   1.017   -   
eDMs 90d 0.980 ' 0.989   -   
Gndr_Cd MALE 0.942 ' 0.908   0.880 * 
nr_motor 1-2 -   0.148 *** 0.397 *** 
nr_motor 3-4 -   0.102 *** 0.362 *** 
nr_motor 5+ -   0.073 *** 0.182 *** 
nr_personal 1 0.937   0.168 *** 0.403 *** 
nr_personal 2 0.762 *** 0.168 *** 0.350 *** 
nr_personal 3 0.680 *** 0.136 *** 0.237 *** 
nr_property 
SINGLE 1.483 *** -   1.158 ' 
number inbound 
90d 0.938 * 0.798 *** 0.801 *** 
tm_contacted 
YES -   0.540 *** 0.703 * 
Web_visits_45d 1.045 * -       
payment 2 1.192 ** 0.885   1.252 * 
payment 3 1.153 ' 1.009   1.273 * 
payment 4 1.115 * 0.781 * 1.181 * 
payment 6 1.260 *** 1.027   1.317 * 
Significance codes: *** = 0.001  // ** = 0.01 // * = 0.05 // ' = 0.1 
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assume this fact holds also for insurance contracts: the price offered by one’s original home 
insurance provider as well as the prices of competitors should affect the decision regarding 
home insurance (the choice problem in Model 1) significantly. As Models 2 and 3 fit their 
respective data better than Model 1, it can be interpreted that price and competitor activity affect 
the decision regarding other products in a customer’s insurance portfolio less than they do home 
insurance. Another argument for economic factors being crucially important in the churn choice 
problem is the significance of wealth-indicating variables in the models. Both the preference of 
paying premium in one installment and the size of insurance portfolio indicate wealth – i.e. less 
pressure for said customer to churn given a more affordable alternative.  
 
I assume differences in price between providers to be the single most important driver of home 
insurance churn at the time of move, especially in lower income individuals. However variables 
used in our data, depicting non-price elements, play a significant role in potentially saving a 
larger customership even if the home insurance is initially lost.  
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6  Conclusions 
 
This thesis proposed the research question: “what are such customer characteristics and 
preferences that indicate an increased probability for churning at the time of a move?” This 
question was broken down into three in Chapter 5. We found that customers indicating lower 
income, smaller insurance portfolio and a shorter customership tenure were more likely to 
change home insurances. We also found that older customers were far more likely to change 
all insurances, given a decision to change the home policy. Further, we found that a long 
customership, a larger insurance portfolio – especially in the personal line of business – as well 
as contact with the original insurer are crucial in preventing full customer churn. 
 
There were one million moving individuals in Finland in 2016, per Posti (2017a). We can 
approximate that for an insurer, one in five customers is a mover at some point during the year. 
The results discussed here offer insight into ways of segmenting the mass of moving customers 
based on the estimated coefficients of the variables. Presented are some examples of said 
segmentation. 
 
The results suggest that a telephone contact by the insurer is not a significant mitigator of home 
insurance churn. Therefore it is not of paramount importance to contact moving customers as 
early as possible. Rather, recognizing instances where a home insurance has been churned and 
treating those customers with a call should yield better results. 
 
The variable denoting customership tenure has significant and large coefficients and therefore 
requires discussion. A customership is active as long as at least one insurance policy is active 
for that customer. It should be in the insurers’ interest to care for and prolong customers in the 
risk-area, i.e. the first two years of customership, by focusing communications on them. Some 
segmentation should also be done based on payment preference – more focus on customers 
paying in multiple installments. 
 
The most crucial improver of movers’ retention, as reported by all three models, is the number 
of personal insurance policies the customer subscribes to. Whereas motor insurance is mostly 
statutory (discussed in 5.2) and home insurance is de-facto statutory, personal insurance is 
optional. The best way for an insurer to combat churn would be to upsell their customers with 
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optional personal insurance in every contact. It is somewhat abstract to offer this as a treatment 
to churn as it is more a long-term commitment by an insurer, rather than a quickly applicable 
bandage. It is nonetheless to be assumed, that the larger the share of movers with more than one 
personal product, the lower the churn rate. 
 
This descriptive econometric research may be followed up by a causal study, testing treatments 
such as the ones proposed above, assessing the applicability of these findings. 
 
As discussed in 5.3, this thesis accounts for economic variables only via proxies. The 
competitive nature of subscription-based businesses as well as the low McFadden R2 –scores 
of the models indicate a presence of heavy price sensitivity. A survey-based study may be more 
appropriate for a research problem such as this one, not only to determine customers’ attitude 
towards price but to capture service attributes of more than one insurer, as McFadden originally 
intended. 
A final notion for future research. The models constructed in this thesis treats all customers as 
equals in the insurer’s eyes. To understand the true effect of churn on an insurer’s result this 
churn model may be complemented with a customer lifetime value –calculation. A CLV-model 
would score a customer based on portfolio size and duration (possibly also profitability). 
Combining such a model with the churn model constructed in this thesis would help the insurer 
in making the decision between targeting a customer with a lower CLV-score but with a higher 
churn probability and a high value customer with a slightly lower churn score. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
The full list of variables before manipulation: 
 
[1] "duration"                       "days_since_last_CX_received"    
 [3] "days_since_last_CX_answered"    "age_group"                      
 [5] "Ctc_email"                      "Ctc_phone"                      
 [7] "Customer_Commented_Eff"         "Customer_Commented_Imp"         
 [9] "CX_forms_answered_last_90d"     "CX_forms_received_last_90d"     
[11] "DMs_last_90d"                   "eDMs_last_90d"                  
[13] "Gndr_Cd"                        "Ins_Polcy_Dlv_Cd"               
[15] "nr_lob_motor_90_days_ago"       "nr_lob_personal_90_days_ago"    
[17] "nr_lob_property_90_days_ago"    "number_of_inbound_calls_90d"    
[19] "num_active_objects_90_days_ago" "times_tm_contacted_last_90d"    
[21] "Web_visits_last_45_days"        "cust_churned"                   
[23] "home_churn_all"                 "payment_plan"                   
[25] "had_personal_90d"               "had_motor_90d"                  
[27] "tm_contacted"                   
 
The anova –tables for Models 1, 2 and 3: 
 
Model 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 2:  
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Model 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
### FINAL REGRESSIONS FOR THESIS 
 
# The data is split into three, after which three experiments are 
performed: 
 
 50 
## 1. home_churn_all is regressed on regressors, full data. 
# i.e. A ~ X [ P(A|X) ] 
 
## 2. cust_churned is regressed on the regressors with data consisting only 
of churners. 
# i.e. B ~ A [ P(B|A) ] 
 
## 3. Finally cust_churned is regressed on with the full data, 
# i.e. B ~ X [ P(B|X) ] 
 
 
########################### READ DATA + VARIABLE MANIPULATION ######## 
 
data <- read.table("gradu2812.csv",header=TRUE,sep=",",na.strings=c("?")) 
colnames(data) 
str(data) 
length(data$duration) 
 
# AGE 
 
ageg <- data$age_group 
 
table(ageg,data$home_churn_all) 
plot(ageg,data$home_churn_all) 
 
ageg <- as.character(ageg) 
levels(ageg) 
ageg[(ageg) == "0-17"] <- "under 27" 
ageg[(ageg) == "18-20"] <- "under 27" 
ageg[(ageg) == "21-26"] <- "under 27" 
ageg[(ageg) == "27-32"] <- "27-38" 
ageg[(ageg) == "33-38"] <- "27-38" 
ageg[(ageg) == "39-44"] <- "39-50" 
ageg[(ageg) == "45-50"] <- "39-50" 
ageg[(ageg) == "51-56"] <- "51-64" 
ageg[(ageg) == "57-65"] <- "51-64" 
ageg[(ageg) == "65+"] <- "65+" 
ageg <- as.factor(ageg) 
levels(ageg) 
data$age_group <- ageg 
 
data$payment_plan <- as.factor(data$payment_plan) 
levels(data$age_group) 
str(data) 
 
data$cust_churned <- (as.factor(data$cust_churned)) 
data$home_churn_all <- (as.factor(data$home_churn_all)) 
data$Gndr_Cd[data$Gndr_Cd == ""] <- "MALE" 
 
data$motor90[(data$nr_lob_motor_90_days_ago) == 0] <- "0" 
data$motor90[(data$nr_lob_motor_90_days_ago) == 1] <- "1-2" 
data$motor90[(data$nr_lob_motor_90_days_ago) == 2] <- "1-2" 
data$motor90[(data$nr_lob_motor_90_days_ago) == 3] <- "3-4" 
data$motor90[(data$nr_lob_motor_90_days_ago) == 4] <- "3-4" 
data$motor90[(data$nr_lob_motor_90_days_ago) > 4] <- "5+" 
data$nr_lob_motor_90_days_ago <- as.factor(data$motor90) 
levels(data$nr_lob_motor_90_days_ago) 
 
data$personal90[(data$nr_lob_personal_90_days_ago) == 0] <- "0" 
data$personal90[(data$nr_lob_personal_90_days_ago) == 1] <- "1" 
data$personal90[(data$nr_lob_personal_90_days_ago) == 2] <- "2" 
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data$personal90[(data$nr_lob_personal_90_days_ago) > 2] <- "3+" 
data$nr_lob_personal_90_days_ago <- as.factor(data$personal90) 
levels(data$nr_lob_personal_90_days_ago) 
 
data$property90[(data$nr_lob_property_90_days_ago) < 5 ] <- "SINGLE" 
data$property90[(data$nr_lob_property_90_days_ago) > 4] <- "MULTIPLE" 
data$nr_lob_property_90_days_ago <- as.factor(data$property90) 
levels(data$nr_lob_property_90_days_ago) 
 
# Categorize duration variable 
 
data$duration_cat[(data$duration) < 366] <- "1 yr" 
data$duration_cat[(data$duration) > 365 & (data$duration) < 731] <- "2 yrs" 
data$duration_cat[(data$duration) > 730 & (data$duration) < 1826] <- "3-5 
yrs" 
data$duration_cat[(data$duration) > 1825 & (data$duration) < 3650] <- "5-10 
yrs" 
data$duration_cat[(data$duration) > 3649] <- "10+ yrs" 
data$duration <- as.factor(data$duration_cat) 
plot(table(data$duration)) 
 
# Drop irrelevant / redundant variables 
 
data$home_churn <- NULL 
data$duration_cat <- NULL 
data$Effort_Score <- NULL 
data$NPS_Score <- NULL 
data$property90 <- NULL 
data$personal90 <- NULL 
data$motor90 <- NULL 
 
## BEGIN TO SUBSET DATA INTO THREE (3) DATAFRAMES ACCORDING TO INTRO: 
colnames(data) 
str(data) 
 
## 1. home_churn_all is regressed on regressors, full data. 
# i.e. A ~ X [ P(A|X) ] 
 
data1 <- data[c(1:13,14,15,16,17,18,20,21,23,24)] 
 
## 70 of the sample size 
smp_size1 <- floor(0.7 * nrow(data1)) 
 
## set the seed to make your partition reproductible 
set.seed(123) 
train_ind1 <- sample(seq_len(nrow(data1)), size = smp_size1) 
train1 <- data1[train_ind1, ] 
test1 <- data1[-train_ind1, ] 
 
homedata1 <- glm(home_churn_all 
~.,family=binomial(link='logit'),data=data1) 
summary(homedata1) 
 
pR2(homedata1) 
anova(homedata1,test="Chisq") 
fitted1 <- predict(homedata1, newdata=test1, type='response') 
fitted1 <- ifelse(fitted1 > 0.5,1,0) 
misClasificError1x <- mean(fitted1 != test1$home_churn_all) 
print(paste('Accuracy',1-misClasificError1x)) 
 
library(ROCR) 
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p1 <- predict(homedata1, newdata=test1, type="response") 
pr1 <- prediction(p1, test1$home_churn_all) 
prf1 <- performance(pr1, measure = "tpr", x.measure = "fpr") 
plot(prf1) 
 
auc1 <- performance(pr1, measure = "auc") 
auc1 <- auc1@y.values[[1]] 
auc1 
 
 
 
 
 
## 2. cust_churned is regressed on the regressors with data consisting only 
of churners. 
# i.e. B ~ A [ P(B|A) ] 
 
data2 <- data[c(1:13,14,15,16,17,18,20,21,22,23,24)] 
data2 <- subset(data2, home_churn_all == "1") 
data2$home_churn_all <- NULL 
 
length(data2$cust_churned) 
 
## 70 of the sample size 
smp_size2 <- floor(0.7 * nrow(data2)) 
 
## set the seed to make your partition reproductible 
set.seed(123) 
train_ind2 <- sample(seq_len(nrow(data2)), size = smp_size2) 
 
train2 <- data2[train_ind2, ] 
test2 <- data2[-train_ind2, ] 
 
homedata2 <- glm(cust_churned ~.,family=binomial(link='logit'),data=data2) 
summary(homedata2) 
pR2(homedata2) 
anova(homedata2,test="Chisq") 
 
fitted2 <- predict(homedata2, newdata=test2, type='response') 
fitted2 <- ifelse(fitted2 > 0.5,1,0) 
misClasificError2x <- mean(fitted2 != test2$home_churn_all) 
print(paste('Accuracy',1-misClasificError2x)) 
 
library(ROCR) 
p2 <- predict(homedata2, newdata=test2, type="response") 
pr2 <- prediction(p2, test2$home_churn_all) 
prf2 <- performance(pr2, measure = "tpr", x.measure = "fpr") 
plot(prf2) 
 
auc2 <- performance(pr2, measure = "auc") 
auc2 <- auc2@y.values[[1]] 
auc2 
 
 
 
## 3. Finally cust_churned is regressed on with the full data, SANS 
home_churn_all 
# i.e. B ~ X [ P(B|X) ] 
 
data3 <- data[c(1:13,14,15,16,17,18,20,21,22,24)] 
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## 70 of the sample size 
smp_size3 <- floor(0.7 * nrow(data3)) 
 
## set the seed to make your partition reproductible 
set.seed(123) 
train_ind3 <- sample(seq_len(nrow(data3)), size = smp_size3) 
 
train3 <- data3[train_ind3, ] 
test3 <- data3[-train_ind3, ] 
 
homedata3x <- glm(cust_churned ~ 
.,family=binomial(link='logit'),data=train3) 
summary(homedata3x) 
anova(homedata3x,test="Chisq") 
pR2(homedata3x) 
 
fitted3 <- predict(homedata3x, newdata=test3, type='response') 
fitted3 <- ifelse(fitted3 > 0.5,1,0) 
 
 
misClasificError3x <- mean(fitted3 != test3$cust_churned) 
print(paste('Accuracy',1-misClasificError3x)) 
 
library(ROCR) 
p3 <- predict(homedata3x, newdata=test3, type="response") 
pr3 <- prediction(p3, test3$cust_churned) 
prf3 <- performance(pr3, measure = "tpr", x.measure = "fpr") 
plot(prf3) 
 
auc3 <- performance(pr3, measure = "auc") 
auc3 <- auc3@y.values[[1]] 
auc3 
 
######################################################################## 
## After running the experiments, it is found that not all variables###### 
# are significant. The anova table reveals the variables to be dropped.#### 
######################################################################## 
 
colnames(data) 
## 1. home_churn_all is regressed on regressors, full data. 
# i.e. A ~ X [ P(A|X) ] 
 
data1 <- data[c(1,2,4,5,12,13,16,17,18,21,23,24)] 
 
## 70 of the sample size 
smp_size1 <- floor(0.7 * nrow(data1)) 
 
## set the seed to make your partition reproductible 
set.seed(123) 
train_ind1 <- sample(seq_len(nrow(data1)), size = smp_size1) 
train1 <- data1[train_ind1, ] 
test1 <- data1[-train_ind1, ] 
 
homedata1 <- glm(home_churn_all 
~.,family=binomial(link='logit'),data=data1) 
summary(homedata1) 
exp(coef(homedata1)) 
pR2(homedata1) 
anova(homedata1,test="Chisq") 
 
library(ROCR) 
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p1 <- predict(homedata1, newdata=test1, type="response") 
pr1 <- prediction(p1, test1$home_churn_all) 
prf1 <- performance(pr1, measure = "tpr", x.measure = "fpr") 
plot(prf1) 
 
auc1 <- performance(pr1, measure = "auc") 
auc1 <- auc1@y.values[[1]] 
auc1 
 
 
 
## 2. cust_churned is regressed on the regressors with data consisting only 
of churners. 
# i.e. B ~ A [ P(B|A) ] 
 
colnames(data) 
data2 <- data[c(1,2,4,10,12,13,15,16,17,18,20,22,23,24)] 
data2 <- subset(data2, home_churn_all == "1") 
data2$home_churn_all <- NULL 
 
length(data2$cust_churned) 
 
## 70 of the sample size 
smp_size2 <- floor(0.7 * nrow(data2)) 
 
## set the seed to make your partition reproductible 
set.seed(123) 
train_ind2 <- sample(seq_len(nrow(data2)), size = smp_size2) 
 
train2 <- data2[train_ind2, ] 
test2 <- data2[-train_ind2, ] 
 
 
homedata2 <- glm(cust_churned ~.,family=binomial(link='logit'),data=data2) 
summary(homedata2) 
pR2(homedata2) 
exp(coef(homedata2)) 
anova(homedata2,test="Chisq") 
 
 
library(ROCR) 
p2 <- predict(homedata2, newdata=test2, type="response") 
pr2 <- prediction(p2, test2$home_churn_all) 
prf2 <- performance(pr2, measure = "tpr", x.measure = "fpr") 
plot(prf2) 
 
auc2 <- performance(pr2, measure = "auc") 
auc2 <- auc2@y.values[[1]] 
auc2 
 
 
 
## 3. Finally cust_churned is regressed on with the full data, SANS 
home_churn_all 
# i.e. B ~ X [ P(B|X) ] 
 
colnames(data) 
data3 <- data[c(1,4,13,15,16,17,18,20,22,24)] 
 
## 70 of the sample size 
smp_size3 <- floor(0.7 * nrow(data3)) 
 55 
 
## set the seed to make your partition reproductible 
set.seed(123) 
train_ind3 <- sample(seq_len(nrow(data3)), size = smp_size3) 
 
train3 <- data3[train_ind3, ] 
test3 <- data3[-train_ind3, ] 
 
homedata3x <- glm(cust_churned ~ 
.,family=binomial(link='logit'),data=train3) 
summary(homedata3x) 
exp(coef(homedata3x)) 
anova(homedata3x,test="Chisq") 
pR2(homedata3x) 
 
 
library(ROCR) 
p3 <- predict(homedata3x, newdata=test3, type="response") 
pr3 <- prediction(p3, test3$cust_churned) 
prf3 <- performance(pr3, measure = "tpr", x.measure = "fpr") 
plot(prf3) 
 
auc3 <- performance(pr3, measure = "auc") 
auc3 <- auc3@y.values[[1]] 
auc3 
 
 
 
 
